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threshold requirements.
First, the court determined Consumer
Cause's notice addressed a health issue that constituted a matter of
indisputable public interest and significance because the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act concerned the quality and
safety of the state's drinking water supply. Second, the court found
the notice was part of a proceeding, as authorized by law, because the
mandated sixty-day notice was generated in connection with the
proposed lawsuit, which constituted an official proceeding.
The court held Consumer Cause satisfied the second requirement
to secure a dismissal under the special motion to strike. The court
determined Equilon had not established a probability that it would
prevail on its claim. Equilon claimed Consumer Cause did not serve
notice on the proper parties and the notice did not provide sufficient
specific information for each gas station regarding the nature of the
alleged discharge and the identification of the alleged drinking water
sources. The court, however, concluded declaratory and injunctive
relief were not proper remedies for a party who received a Proposition
65 notice of intent to sue. The court found Equilon could have raised
a deficient notice defense to an enforcement action, and the
Proposition 65 notice was absolutely privileged. The court asserted
that allowing Proposition 65 private enforcers to be sued before they,
themselves, decide to bring suit would seriously undermine the goals
of the state initiative. The court noted that such "chilling effect"
would thwart the goal of public participation and prevent some citizen
and environmental groups from alerting government officials of water
pollution violations.
The court affirmed the lower court's decision because (1)
Consumer Cause established a prima facie case that it was sued by
Equilon after exercising its First Amendment right to petition the
government in connection with a public issue-conduct protected by
both California law and the SLAPP statute; and (2) the oil companies
were unlikely to prevail on their claims. Additionally, the court stated
that Consumer Cause could bring a motion in the trial court to
recover the attorney fees and costs incurred while appealing this case.
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In November 1999, Excelsior, Inc. ("Excelsior") filed an
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included building a new residential road across a watercourse and
modifying the channel of an intermittent watercourse. After the town
engineer, health director, fire marshal, and the Commission's
conservation officer reviewed Excelsior's plan, the Commission
unanimously approved the application in February 2000. Mary
McNee, the abutting property owner, appealed the Commission's
decision to the Connecticut Superior Court.
McNee first asserted the decision was contrary to law because the
Commission failed to abide by its own regulations. Specifically, she
contended the proposed activity met the regulatory definition of a
"significant impact activity," and, therefore, state law required the
Commission to conduct a public hearing before making its decision.
The relevant statute states the agency "shall not hold a public hearing"
unless: (1) the proposed activity will have a significant impact on
wetlands or watercourses; (2) a petition signed by at least twenty-five
persons requesting a hearing is filed with the agency; or (3) the agency
finds a hearing would be in the public interest. Because a petition was
not submitted, the court held the Commission had total discretion to
determine whether to hold a hearing. Furthermore, the court found
the record contained more than substantial evidence to support the
Commission's decisions to grant the application, and to do so without
a public hearing.
McNee claimed the Commission had the responsibility to regulate
the subdivision's water supply prior to granting the application. The
court ruled McNee failed to provide authority to support her claim.
McNee contended the Commission failed to provide required
notice to Olmstead Water Supply Co. ("Olmstead"), which owned
property within 200 feet of the proposed project. The court found
McNee failed to provide any law or facts to support this claim. The
court stated, even if personal notice was required, only Olmstead, not
McNee, had standing to raise this issue. The court also held any
failure to give such notice did not create a jurisdictional defect that
would render the Commission's decision void.
Finally, the court rejected McNee's claim that the Commission
should have required Excelsior to obtain a discharge permit. The
court held state law contains no provision that would have required
Excelsior to obtain a permit before application to or decision by the
Moreover, the Commissioner of Environmental
Commission.
Protection, not the wetlands agency, has jurisdiction over whether and
when a discharge permit is required.
Because the court concluded that McNee failed to prove the
decision was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion, the court
dismissed the appeal.
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